Fragile meaning -- an experiment

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2024.105797WikidataQ129329938 ScholiaQ129329938MaRDI QIDQ6203353FDOQ6203353

Bohan Ye, Charles N. Noussair, Andreas Blume

Publication date: 27 March 2024

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

common knowledgemeaningexperimentscommunication gamesshared language

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites Work

• Strategic Information Transmission
• The Theory of Global Games on Test: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information
• Evolutions of communication with partial common interest
• Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
• Identifying Higher-Order Rationality
• The variable frame theory of focal points: An experimental study
• Why Are Certain Properties of Binary Relations Relatively More Common in Natural Language?
• Language barriers
• Coordination and learning with a partial language
• Cognitive forward induction and coordination without common knowledge: an experimental study
• Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games
• Voronoi languages: equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signals
• A learning-efficiency explanation of structure in language
• Communication between rational agents
• Language and the Theory of the Firm
• Communication under language barriers
• Failure of common knowledge of language in common-interest communication games
• Cheap talk with coarse understanding

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