Cognitive forward induction and coordination without common knowledge: an experimental study
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Publication:2268106
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.07.011zbMath1200.91061MaRDI QIDQ2268106
Publication date: 10 March 2010
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.07.011
91A90: Experimental studies
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