Coordination and learning with a partial language

DOI10.1006/JETH.2000.2674zbMATH Open0972.91082OpenAlexW2054175961MaRDI QIDQ1592822FDOQ1592822

Authors: Andreas Blume 

Publication date: 13 May 2001

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/52600

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zbMATH Keywords

common knowledgecoordinationlanguageoptimal learningcommon knownledge

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Combinatorial games (91A46) Linguistics (91F20)

Cites Work

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• Why Are Certain Properties of Binary Relations Relatively More Common in Natural Language?
• Debates and decisions: On a rationale of argumentation rules.
• An experimental investigation of optimal learning in coordination games
• Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games
• Evolutionary stability in games of communication
• Neighborhood stability in sender-receiver games
• Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts
• Über den Transitivitätsgrad von Permutationsgruppen
• Can we rationally learn to coordinate?
• Dynamic focal points in \(N\)-person coordination games

Cited In (16)

• Signaling games
• Coordination via correlation: an experimental study
• A learning-efficiency explanation of structure in language
• Focal points and payoff information in tacit bargaining
• Learning, words and actions: experimental evidence on coordination-improving information
• Knowledge, awareness and probabilistic beliefs
• Compromise and coordination: an experimental study
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The measurement of the value of a language
• Symmetric play in repeated allocation games
• Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions
• Fragile meaning -- an experiment
• An experimental investigation of optimal learning in coordination games
• Decentralized learning from failure
• Cognitive forward induction and coordination without common knowledge: an experimental study
• The emergence of compositional grammars in artificial codes

Uses Software

• GAP

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