Decentralized learning from failure

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2006.01.005zbMATH Open1280.91021OpenAlexW2009612028MaRDI QIDQ2370513FDOQ2370513

Authors: Andreas Blume, April Mitchell Franco 

Publication date: 26 June 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.01.005

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zbMATH Keywords

symmetrysearchattainabilitydecentralization

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
• An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
• Why Are Certain Properties of Binary Relations Relatively More Common in Natural Language?
• Egalitarianism and efficiency in repeated symmetric games
• Coordination and learning with a partial language
• Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games
• Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting
• Dynamic focal points in \(N\)-person coordination games
• Spatial dispersion as a dynamic coordination problem

Cited In (4)

• Social distancing, gathering, search games: mobile agents on simple networks
• Learning models for decentralized decision making
• Dynamic coordination via organizational routines
• A depletion of assets model of organizational learning*

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