Decentralized learning from failure

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2006.01.005MaRDI QIDQ2370513zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Andreas Blume, April Mitchell Franco

Publication date 26 June 2007

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.01.005

zbMATH Keywords

symmetrysearchattainabilitydecentralization

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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• A Theory of Learning with Heterogeneous Agents
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3479762 (Why is no real title available?)
• An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
• Coordination and learning with a partial language
• Dynamic focal points in \(N\)-person coordination games
• Egalitarianism and efficiency in repeated symmetric games
• Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games
• Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting
• Spatial dispersion as a dynamic coordination problem
• Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Why Are Certain Properties of Binary Relations Relatively More Common in Natural Language?

Cited in

(4)

• Social distancing, gathering, search games: mobile agents on simple networks
• Learning models for decentralized decision making
• Dynamic coordination via organizational routines
• A depletion of assets model of organizational learning*

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