Decentralized learning from failure

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.01.005zbMath1280.91021OpenAlexW2009612028MaRDI QIDQ2370513

Andreas Blume, April Mitchell Franco

Publication date: 26 June 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.01.005

zbMATH Keywords

symmetrysearchdecentralizationattainability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (2)

Social distancing, gathering, search games: mobile agents on simple networks ⋮ Dynamic coordination via organizational routines

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
• Egalitarianism and efficiency in repeated symmetric games
• Coordination and learning with a partial language
• Spatial dispersion as a dynamic coordination problem
• Dynamic focal points in \(N\)-person coordination games
• Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games
• An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
• Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Why Are Certain Properties of Binary Relations Relatively More Common in Natural Language?

This page was built for publication: Decentralized learning from failure