Dynamic focal points in \(N\)-person coordination games

DOI10.1007/BF00134211zbMath0852.90144MaRDI QIDQ1918932

Francis Kramarz

Publication date: 23 July 1996

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

language; focal point; strategic uncertainty; infinitely repeated \(N\)-player coordination games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

Related Items

Rendezvous search when marks are left at the starting points, Egalitarianism and efficiency in repeated symmetric games, Coordination and learning with a partial language, An experimental investigation of optimal learning in coordination games, Decentralized learning from failure, The evolution of focal points

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