Remarks on the Intrinsic Equations of Twisted Curves
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Publication:3264629
DOI10.2307/2308980zbMath0089.37801OpenAlexW4255452036MaRDI QIDQ3264629
Publication date: 1960
Published in: The American Mathematical Monthly (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2308980
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