Putting free-riding to work: A partnership solution to the common-property problem

DOI10.1016/j.jeem.2008.07.004zbMath1186.91161MaRDI QIDQ2380699

Stephen W. Salant, Stephan Schott, Martin D. Heintzelman

Publication date: 8 April 2010

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2008.07.004

zbMATH Keywords

cooperatives; team production; cartelization; catch-sharing; hunter-gatherer

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91A80: Applications of game theory

91B76: Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.)

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

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Complete Versus Partial Collusion in Competing Coalitions, Impact of equity and equality on stability and collusion in a decentralized network, A free lunch in the commons, Managing partially protected resources under uncertainty, Revenue-sharing clubs provide economic insurance and incentives for sustainability in common-pool resource systems

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