Material interests, moral reputation, and crowding out species protection on private land

DOI10.1016/J.JEEM.2011.05.008MaRDI QIDQ456424zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Prasenjit Banerjee, Jason F. Shogren

Publication date 25 October 2012

Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2011.05.008

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationcrowding outendangered speciesmechanism designreputation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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Cites work

• A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May be One Consequence
• Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
• Focal points in pure coordination games: An experimental investigation
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
• Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation
• Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design
• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Regulation, reputation, and environmental risk
• Remarks on the Intrinsic Equations of Twisted Curves
• Social image and the 50-50 norm: a theoretical and experimental analysis of audience effects
• The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont
• The marginal cost of species preservation: The northern spotted owl
• Voluntary incentive design for endangered species protection
• Warm-Glow versus Cold-Prickle: The Effects of Positive and Negative Framing on Cooperation in Experiments

Cited in

(5)

• When the truth hurts: Endangered species policy on private land with imperfect information
• The market for conservation and other hostages
• Restoring the commons: optimizing the restoration of natural assets
• Voluntary incentive design for endangered species protection
• Search, bioprospecting and biodiversity conservation

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