Material interests, moral reputation, and crowding out species protection on private land

DOI10.1016/j.jeem.2011.05.008zbMath1250.91073MaRDI QIDQ456424

Prasenjit Banerjee, Jason F. Shogren

Publication date: 25 October 2012

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2011.05.008

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric information; mechanism design; endangered species; reputation; crowding out

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B76: Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.)

91B18: Public goods

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Voluntary incentive design for endangered species protection
• Regulation, reputation, and environmental risk
• The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont
• Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design
• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Focal points in pure coordination games: An experimental investigation
• The marginal cost of species preservation: The northern spotted owl
• Remarks on the Intrinsic Equations of Twisted Curves
• Social Image and the 50-50 Norm: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects
• A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May be One Consequence
• Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation
• Warm-Glow versus Cold-Prickle: The Effects of Positive and Negative Framing on Cooperation in Experiments
• Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment