Material interests, moral reputation, and crowding out species protection on private land
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May be One Consequence
- Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
- Focal points in pure coordination games: An experimental investigation
- Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation
- Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design
- Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
- Regulation, reputation, and environmental risk
- Remarks on the Intrinsic Equations of Twisted Curves
- Social image and the 50-50 norm: a theoretical and experimental analysis of audience effects
- The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont
- The marginal cost of species preservation: The northern spotted owl
- Voluntary incentive design for endangered species protection
- Warm-Glow versus Cold-Prickle: The Effects of Positive and Negative Framing on Cooperation in Experiments
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