Decisiveness of contributors' perceptions in elections

DOI10.1007/S00199-011-0605-YMaRDI QIDQ412079zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Rebecca B. Morton, Roger B. Myerson

Publication date 3 May 2012

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0605-y

zbMATH Keywords

campaign spendingelectoral equilibriapolicy divergence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10)

Recommendations

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• Voting cycles and the structure of individual preferences

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
• Campaign Advertising and Voter Welfare
• Elections with platform and valence competition
• Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
• Remarks on the Intrinsic Equations of Twisted Curves
• The pro-competitive effect of campaign limits in non-majoritarian elections

Cited in

(16)

• Extreme donors and policy convergence
• Candidate eco-labeling and senate campaign contributions
• Introduction to the symposium in political economy
• The pro-competitive effect of campaign limits in non-majoritarian elections
• When do simple policies win?
• Voting as a signaling device
• How to win a large election
• Elections with platform and valence competition
• Incumbent reputations and ideological campaign contributions in spatial competition
• Electoral institutions with impressionable voters
• Manipulation through political endorsements
• A theory of decisive leadership
• Modeling the effect of campaign advertising on US presidential elections when differences across states matter
• Civic duty and political advertising
• Can paying politicians well reduce corruption? The effects of wages and uncertainty on electoral competition
• Campaign Advertising and Voter Welfare

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