The pro-competitive effect of campaign limits in non-majoritarian elections
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Publication:412081
DOI10.1007/S00199-011-0613-YzbMATH Open1277.91153OpenAlexW2166606731MaRDI QIDQ412081FDOQ412081
Authors: Matias Iaryczower, Andrea Mattozzi 
Publication date: 3 May 2012
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/79460/
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Cites Work
- On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition"
- The all-pay auction with complete information
- Campaign spending regulation in a model of redistributive politics
- Relaxing Price Competition Through Product Differentiation
- Spatial Equilibrium with Entry
- An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
- A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
- Competence and ideology
- Equilibrium with Product Differentiation
- Elections, governments, and parliaments in proportional representation systems
- Political Motivations
- A dynamic theory of parliamentary democracy
- Effectiveness of electoral systems for reducing government corruption: A game-theoretic analysis
- Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate
- Compaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies
- Decisiveness of contributors' perceptions in elections
- The pro-competitive effect of campaign limits in non-majoritarian elections
- Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
- Elections with platform and valence competition
Cited In (9)
- Decisiveness of contributors' perceptions in elections
- Introduction to the symposium in political economy
- The pro-competitive effect of campaign limits in non-majoritarian elections
- When do simple policies win?
- Voting as a signaling device
- Campaign spending regulation in a model of redistributive politics
- The all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities
- Civic duty and political advertising
- A coalitional theory of unemployment insurance and employment protection
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