The pro-competitive effect of campaign limits in non-majoritarian elections

DOI10.1007/S00199-011-0613-YMaRDI QIDQ412081zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Matias Iaryczower, Andrea Mattozzi

Publication date 3 May 2012

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://authors.library.caltech.edu/79460/

zbMATH Keywords

campaign limitscampaign spendingelectionspolitical parties

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

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Cites work

• A dynamic theory of parliamentary democracy
• A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
• An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
• Campaign spending regulation in a model of redistributive politics
• Compaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies
• Competence and ideology
• Decisiveness of contributors' perceptions in elections
• Effectiveness of electoral systems for reducing government corruption: A game-theoretic analysis
• Elections with platform and valence competition
• Elections, governments, and parliaments in proportional representation systems
• Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
• Equilibrium with Product Differentiation
• Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate
• On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition"
• Political Motivations
• Relaxing Price Competition Through Product Differentiation
• Spatial Equilibrium with Entry
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• The pro-competitive effect of campaign limits in non-majoritarian elections

Cited in

(9)

• Civic duty and political advertising
• A coalitional theory of unemployment insurance and employment protection
• The all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities
• Voting as a signaling device
• Campaign spending regulation in a model of redistributive politics
• Decisiveness of contributors' perceptions in elections
• The pro-competitive effect of campaign limits in non-majoritarian elections
• Introduction to the symposium in political economy
• When do simple policies win?

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