Electoral competition with entry under non-majoritarian run-off rules

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.05.007MaRDI QIDQ2013365zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Peter Buisseret

Publication date 17 August 2017

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.007

zbMATH Keywords

entry deterrenceelectoral competitionrun-off

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Entry deterrence in electoral spatial competition
• A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
• Spatial Equilibrium with Entry
• Electoral competition with strategic voters
• Existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium in a model of spatial electoral competition with entry

Cites work

• A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
• Entry deterrence in electoral spatial competition
• Entry-deterring policy differentiation by electoral candidates
• Majority runoff elections: strategic voting and Duverger's hypothesis
• Simple plurality versus plurality runoff with privately informed voters
• Spatial Equilibrium with Entry
• The Hotelling-Downs model with runoff voting

Cited in

(2)

• Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives
• The pro-competitive effect of campaign limits in non-majoritarian elections

This page was built for publication: Electoral competition with entry under non-majoritarian run-off rules

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2013365)