Majority runoff elections: strategic voting and Duverger's hypothesis

DOI10.3982/TE1642MaRDI QIDQ4586005zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Laurent Bouton, Gabriele Gratton

Publication date 11 September 2018

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/TE1642

zbMATH Keywords

Poisson gamesrunoff electionsstrategic voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Information aggregation with runoff voting
• Mixed equilibria in runoff elections
• Many-candidate Nash equilibria for elections involving random selection
• Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule
• Majority rule when voters like to win

Cited in

(17)

• Many-candidate Nash equilibria for elections involving random selection
• Information aggregation with runoff voting
• Electoral competition with entry under non-majoritarian run-off rules
• Stress-testing the runoff rule in the laboratory
• Electoral institutions with impressionable voters
• Poisson voting games under proportional rule
• Incomplete information, proportional representation and strategic voting
• The structure of Nash equilibria in Poisson games
• Simple plurality versus plurality runoff with privately informed voters
• Voting in legislative elections under plurality rule
• Strategic stability in Poisson games
• Expressive voting and its cost: evidence from runoffs with two or three candidates
• Scoring run-off paradoxes for variable electorates
• Poisson-Cournot games
• Voter coordination in elections: a case for approval voting
• The framing of elections: cooperation vs. competition
• The Hotelling-Downs model with runoff voting

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