Scoring run-off paradoxes for variable electorates
A finite set of voters strictly orders a finite set of candidates or alternatives. A scoring rule assigns points to the candidates according to the individual rankings and a run-off rule selects a subset of the candidates for a subsequent round of voting. It is well-known that this situation suffers from a `no-show' paradox where a voter or group of voters may obtain a more favorable outcome by abstaining than by voting. As voters may choose not to vote, the size of the electorate may vary. In this paper, the authors investigate the likelihood of such a situation for the case of three candidates and different sizes of electorate. The authors subdivide the paradox according to whether voters are added to or subtracted from the electorate and whether the change is advantageous to a loser or disadvantageous to a winner. The authors first determine necessary and sufficient conditions for each of these four cases to arise. The authors determine probabilities under the assumption of the Impartial Culture condition where each voter chooses from a uniform distribution and the Impartial Anonymous Culture condition where each voting situation is equally likely. The authors compute the probabilities of the paradoxes under various scoring rules for both small electorates and large electorates, giving limiting values in the latter case. As the size of the electorate increases, the probability of a given paradox decreases, but not always monotonically, even after distinguishing even and odd electorates. The authors also show that abstention is not necessarily the optimal strategy for a group of voters when it is available.
- The likelihood of monotonicity paradoxes in run-off elections
- Towards a Dichotomy of Finding Possible Winners in Elections Based on Scoring Rules
- Towards a dichotomy for the possible winner problem in elections based on scoring rules
- The scoring rules in an endogenous election
- Mixed equilibria in runoff elections
- Dichotomy for pure scoring rules under manipulative electoral actions
- Condorcet efficiency of constant scoring rules for large electorates
- Monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections using scoring elimination rules
- Majority runoff elections: strategic voting and Duverger's hypothesis
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 878682
- The likelihood of monotonicity paradoxes in run-off elections
- Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving
- Monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections using scoring elimination rules
- The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes
- Towards a dichotomy for the possible winner problem in elections based on scoring rules
- The reinforcement axiom under sequential positional rules
- Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies
- How frequently do different voting rules encounter voting paradoxes in three-candidate elections?
- Complexity and the geometry of voting
- Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis
- Condorcet's principle and the strong no-show paradoxes
- Violations of Reversal Symmetry Under Simple and Runoff Scoring Rules
- Exploring the No-Show Paradox for Condorcet Extensions
- Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: The Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems
- From Gehrlein-Fishburn’s Method on Frequency Representation to a Direct Proof of Ehrhart’s extended Conjecture
- IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report
- Monotonicity anomalies in Scottish local government elections
- New fairness criteria for truncated ballots in multi-winner ranked-choice elections
- The negative participation paradox in three-candidate instant runoff elections
- Condorcet vs. Borda in light of a dual majoritarian approach
- Single Transferable Vote and Paradoxes of Negative and Positive Involvement
- The Hotelling-Downs model with runoff voting
This page was built for publication: Scoring run-off paradoxes for variable electorates
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5927694)
