The scoring rules in an endogenous election
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2500707
DOI10.1007/s00355-005-0034-6zbMath1132.91401OpenAlexW1995819118MaRDI QIDQ2500707
Bernardo Moreno, M. Socorro Puy
Publication date: 18 August 2006
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-005-0034-6
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