The scoring rules in an endogenous election
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Publication:2500707
DOI10.1007/S00355-005-0034-6zbMATH Open1132.91401OpenAlexW1995819118MaRDI QIDQ2500707FDOQ2500707
Authors: Bernardo Moreno, M. Socorro Puy 
Publication date: 18 August 2006
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-005-0034-6
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Cites Work
- Geometry of voting
- On the probability of electing the Condorcet loser
- An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
- A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
- Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
- Scoring rules, Condorcet efficiency and social homogeneity
- Voting by successive elimination and strategic candidacy
- An experiment on coordination in multi-candidate elections: The importance of polls and election histories
- The geometry of Black's single peakedness and related conditions
- Plurality rule works in three-candidate elections
- A note on scoring rules that respect majority in choice and elimination.
- Scoring rules cannot respect majority in choice and elimination simultaneously
Cited In (11)
- Line-up elections: parallel voting with shared candidate pool
- The unexpected behavior of plurality rule
- Regles positionnelles iteratives, principe majoritaire et preferences unimodales
- Strategic voting and nomination
- Size approval voting
- Plurality rule works in three-candidate elections
- Towards a dichotomy for the possible winner problem in elections based on scoring rules
- Scoring run-off paradoxes for variable electorates
- Condorcet consistent scoring rules and single-peakedness
- Condorcet-loser dominance between the plurality rule and other scoring rules
- On the selection of the same winner by all scoring rules
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