The scoring rules in an endogenous election

DOI10.1007/S00355-005-0034-6MaRDI QIDQ2500707zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Bernardo Moreno, M. Socorro Puy

Publication date 18 August 2006

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-005-0034-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Plurality rule works in three-candidate elections
• Constant scoring rules, Condorcet criteria and single-peaked preferences
• Condorcet consistent scoring rules and single-peakedness
• A simple characterization of plurality rule
• The unexpected behavior of plurality rule

Cites work

• A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
• A note on scoring rules that respect majority in choice and elimination.
• An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
• An experiment on coordination in multi-candidate elections: The importance of polls and election histories
• Geometry of voting
• On the probability of electing the Condorcet loser
• Plurality rule works in three-candidate elections
• Scoring rules cannot respect majority in choice and elimination simultaneously
• Scoring rules, Condorcet efficiency and social homogeneity
• Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
• The geometry of Black's single peakedness and related conditions
• Voting by successive elimination and strategic candidacy

Cited in

(11)

• Line-up elections: parallel voting with shared candidate pool
• The unexpected behavior of plurality rule
• Regles positionnelles iteratives, principe majoritaire et preferences unimodales
• Strategic voting and nomination
• Size approval voting
• Plurality rule works in three-candidate elections
• Towards a dichotomy for the possible winner problem in elections based on scoring rules
• Scoring run-off paradoxes for variable electorates
• Condorcet consistent scoring rules and single-peakedness
• Condorcet-loser dominance between the plurality rule and other scoring rules
• On the selection of the same winner by all scoring rules

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