Condorcet-loser dominance between the plurality rule and other scoring rules

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2024.111652MaRDI QIDQ6549830zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Ryoga Doi, Noriaki Okamoto

Publication date 4 June 2024

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.ECONLET.2024.111652

zbMATH Keywords

Borda ruleCondorcet loserplurality rulescoring rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• The scoring rules in an endogenous election
• Strong Condorcet efficiency of scoring rules
• Condorcet vs. Borda in light of a dual majoritarian approach
• On the probability of electing the Condorcet loser
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Cites work

• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• Scoring rules, Condorcet efficiency and social homogeneity
• Social Choice Scoring Functions
• The Borda rule and the pairwise-majority-loser revisited

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