Social Choice Scoring Functions
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(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Size approval voting
- Research in decision theory: A personal perspective
- On the information about individual utilities used in social choice
- Concorcet's principle implies the no show paradox
- Inverted orders for monotone scoring rules
- Social choice for bliss-point problems
- Dominant strategies and restricted ballots with variable electorate
- Characterizations of the plurality function
- On the indicator function of the plurality function
- Consensus sequences based on plurality rule
- Manipulation of social choice functions
- Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof
- Extending Condorcet's rule
- Consensus rules for committee elections
- The socially acceptable scoring rule
- Revealed votes
- Axiomatic characterisations of the basic best-worst rule
- Voting with evaluations: characterizations of evaluative voting and range voting
- Characterizing plurality rule on a fixed population
- Revisiting the connection between the no-show paradox and monotonicity
- Axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules
- Judgments aggregation by a sequential majority procedure
- A simple characterization of the anti-plurality rule
- Binary choice, subset choice, random utility, and ranking: a unified perspective using the permutahedron
- Group support and top-heavy rules
- The reinforcement axiom under sequential positional rules
- Representation in majority tournaments
- Acyclicity, anonymity, and prefilters
- Robust winner determination in positional scoring rules with uncertain weights
- Consistent approval-based multi-winner rules
- The Borda class. An axiomatic study of the Borda rule on top-truncated preferences
- Consistency of scoring rules: a reinvestigation of composition-consistency
- Voting to select projects in participatory budgeting
- Group decisions from individual rankings: the Borda-Condorcet rule
- How to choose a fair delegation?
- Inductive inference with incompleteness
- Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: a catalogue of characterizations
- A theoretical examination of the ranked choice voting procedure
- Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules
- A correspondence between voting procedures and stochastic orderings
- Positionalist voting rules: a general definition and axiomatic characterizations
- An axiomatic characterization of the Slater rule
- Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections
- The Borda rule and the pairwise-majority-loser revisited
- Weighted committee games
- Condorcet consistent scoring rules and single-peakedness
- Majority rule in the absence of a majority
- Utilitarianism without individual utilities
- Scoring rules and social choice properties: some characterizations
- Maskin-monotonic scoring rules
- On stable rules for selecting committees
- A characterization of the Borda rule in peer ratings
- Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average?
- A characterization of the rational mean neat voting rules
- Rational status quo
- Distance rationalization of anonymous and homogeneous voting rules
- An axiomatic characterization of the Borda mean rule
- Axioms for Euclidean preferences with a valence dimension
- Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: an axiomatic generalization of approval voting
- Formal utilitarianism and range voting
- Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
- On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules
- The Efron dice voting system
- Voting rules as statistical estimators
- Properties of multiwinner voting rules
- Weighted scoring committees
- Voting: a machine learning approach
- Collective Choice for Simple Preferences
- Duplication in OWA-generated positional aggregation rules
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6099704 (Why is no real title available?)
- The scorix: a popular representation of votes revisited
- A decomposition of strategy-proofness
- Discrete Mathematics in Voting and Group Choice
- Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences
- A new characterization of simple majority
- Variable-population voting rules
- Weighted majoritarian rules for the location of multiple public facilities
- Scoring rules for judgment aggregation
- Are Condorcet procedures so bad according to the reinforcement axiom?
- A general scoring rule
- Choice and individual welfare
- On the Indicator Plurality Function
- Condorcet-consistent and approximately strategyproof tournament rules
- Manipulation can be hard in tractable voting systems even for constant-sized coalitions
- Generalized Condorcet winners
- Positional rules and \(q\)-Condorcet consistency
- Finding the threshold of exclusion for all single seat and multi-seat scoring rules: illustrated by results for the Borda and Dowdall rules
- Social Choice Theory
- A theory of measuring, electing, and ranking
- The greatest unhappiness of the least number
- The greatest unhappiness of the least number
- A non-lexicographic rule in the preference-approval setting
- New characterizations of strategy-proofness under single-peakedness
- Negative voting social welfare functions: a characterization
- Scoring indices, top-truncated preferences, and splitting invariance
- Opinion aggregation: Borda and Condorcet revisited
- Condorcet-loser dominance between the plurality rule and other scoring rules
- Bivariate scoring rules: unifying the characterizations of positional scoring rules and Kemeny's rule
- Note on compromise axiom
- Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities
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