Generalized Condorcet winners
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Publication:483530
DOI10.1007/S00355-013-0765-8zbMATH Open1302.91086OpenAlexW2158633442MaRDI QIDQ483530FDOQ483530
Authors: Aaron Meyers, Michael E. Orrison, Jennifer Townsend, Sarah Wolff, Angela Y. Wu 
Publication date: 17 December 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0765-8
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Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Condorcet Social Choice Functions
- Basic Geometry of Voting
- A dictionary for voting paradoxes
- Social Choice Scoring Functions
- Condorcet’s Paradox
- Symmetry extensions of neutrality. I: Advantage to the Condorcet loser
- On the probability that all decision rules select the same winner
- On the likelihood of Condorcet's profiles
- Symmetry extensions of ``neutrality. II: Partial ordering of dictionaries
Cited In (4)
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