Condorcet winners and social acceptability

DOI10.1007/S00355-019-01204-7MaRDI QIDQ2296033zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Muhammad Mahajne, Oscar Volij

Publication date 17 February 2020

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://in.bgu.ac.il/en/humsos/Econ/Workingpapers/1812.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Condorcet winnersocial acceptability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Social acceptability of Condorcet committees
• Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners
• Generalized Condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences
• Preference domains and the monotonicity of Condorcet extensions
• The socially acceptable scoring rule

Cites work

• Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives
• Order restricted preferences and majority rule
• Single-crossing, strategic voting and the median choice rule
• The \(q\)-majority efficiency of positional rules
• The Borda rule, Condorcet consistency and Condorcet stability
• The generic existence of a core for \(q\)-rules
• The socially acceptable scoring rule

Cited in

(12)

• The socially acceptable scoring rule
• Generalized Condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences
• Condorcet winning sets
• Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1082116 (Why is no real title available?)
• Generalized Condorcet winners
• Preference domains and the monotonicity of Condorcet extensions
• Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule
• Social unacceptability for simple voting procedures
• Social acceptability of Condorcet committees
• Condorcet winners for public goods
• Level \(r\) consensus and stable social choice

This page was built for publication: Condorcet winners and social acceptability

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2296033)