Social acceptability of Condorcet committees

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2020.03.004MaRDI QIDQ777455zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mostapha Diss, Muhammad Mahajne

Publication date 7 July 2020

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02003292/document

zbMATH Keywords

votingCondorcetcommitteemultiwinner electionssocial acceptability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Condorcet winners and social acceptability
• When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?
• The Condorcet criterion and committee selection
• Some startling inconsistencies when electing committees
• How hard is it to tell which is a Condorcet committee?

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3163858 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions
• An Analysis of Simple Voting Systems for Electing Committees
• An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
• Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation
• Borda's paradox with weighted scoring rules
• Computations of volumes and Ehrhart series in four candidates elections
• Condorcet winners and social acceptability
• Condorcet winning sets
• Elections, voting rules and paradoxical outcomes
• How to choose a non-controversial list with \(k\) names
• Level \(r\) consensus and stable social choice
• Majority committees
• On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
• On stable rules for selecting committees
• Positional rules and \(q\)-Condorcet consistency
• Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis
• Properties of multiwinner voting rules
• Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners
• Single-crossing, strategic voting and the median choice rule
• Some startling inconsistencies when electing committees
• Sur un probl?me de g?om?trie diophantienne lin?aire. I. Poly?dres et r?seaux.
• The Borda rule, Condorcet consistency and Condorcet stability
• The Condorcet criterion and committee selection
• The Simple Majority Decision Rule
• The \(q\)-majority efficiency of positional rules
• The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable
• The probability of the paradox of voting: A computable solution
• The socially acceptable scoring rule
• Voting paradoxes and group coherence. The Condorcet efficiency of voting rules.
• Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC?

Cited in

(10)

• Condorcet winners and social acceptability
• Voting for Committees in Agreeable Societies
• Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule
• Probabilities of electoral outcomes: from three-candidate to four-candidate elections
• Social unacceptability for simple voting procedures
• The Condorcet criterion and committee selection
• IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report
• The socially acceptable scoring rule
• When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?
• Coincidence of Condorcet committees

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Uses Software

• Convex
• Normaliz

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