Level r consensus and stable social choice

DOI10.1007/S00355-015-0882-7MaRDI QIDQ904833zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Muhammad Mahajne, Shmuel Nitzan, Oscar Volij

Publication date 14 January 2016

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0882-7

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• A comparison of some distance-based choice rules in ranking environments
• A dictionary for voting paradoxes
• Chaotic elections! A mathematician looks at voting
• Condorcet Social Choice Functions
• Explaining all three-alternative voting outcomes
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1897331 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3405712 (Why is no real title available?)
• Inverted orders for monotone scoring rules
• Mathematical structure of voting paradoxes. I: Pairwise votes
• More on the Preservation of Preference Proximity and Anonymous Social Choice
• NON-NULL RANKING MODELS. I
• On the selection of the same winner by all scoring rules
• Preference Proximity and Anonymous Social Choice
• Social compromise and social metrics
• Some general results on the metric rationalization for social decision rules
• Some measures of closeness to unanimity and their implications
• The Borda Rule and Pareto Stability: A Comment
• The ultimate of chaos resulting from weighted voting systems

Cited in

(6)

• Flexible level-1 consensus ensuring stable social choice: analysis and algorithms
• Does avoiding bad voting rules result in good ones?
• Pairwise consensus and the Borda rule
• On one class of non-local aggregation rules
• On stable solutions to the ordinal social choice problem
• Social acceptability of Condorcet committees

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