Level \(r\) consensus and stable social choice
From MaRDI portal
Publication:904833
DOI10.1007/s00355-015-0882-7zbMath1341.91071MaRDI QIDQ904833
Muhammad Mahajne, Shmuel Nitzan, Oscar Volij
Publication date: 14 January 2016
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0882-7
Related Items
Social acceptability of Condorcet committees, Flexible level-1 consensus ensuring stable social choice: analysis and algorithms, Does avoiding bad voting rules result in good ones?, Pairwise consensus and the Borda rule
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Some general results on the metric rationalization for social decision rules
- Social compromise and social metrics
- A dictionary for voting paradoxes
- Inverted orders for monotone scoring rules
- Some measures of closeness to unanimity and their implications
- A comparison of some distance-based choice rules in ranking environments
- Explaining all three-alternative voting outcomes
- Mathematical structure of voting paradoxes. I: Pairwise votes
- The ultimate of chaos resulting from weighted voting systems
- On the selection of the same winner by all scoring rules
- NON-NULL RANKING MODELS. I
- Preference Proximity and Anonymous Social Choice
- More on the Preservation of Preference Proximity and Anonymous Social Choice
- Condorcet Social Choice Functions
- The Borda Rule and Pareto Stability: A Comment
