Level r consensus and stable social choice

DOI10.1007/S00355-015-0882-7zbMATH Open1341.91071OpenAlexW3122379648MaRDI QIDQ904833FDOQ904833

Authors: Muhammad Mahajne, Shmuel Nitzan, Oscar Volij 

Publication date: 14 January 2016

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0882-7

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

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• Some general results on the metric rationalization for social decision rules
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• Condorcet Social Choice Functions
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• A dictionary for voting paradoxes
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• Social compromise and social metrics
• Mathematical structure of voting paradoxes. I: Pairwise votes
• Preference Proximity and Anonymous Social Choice
• A comparison of some distance-based choice rules in ranking environments
• The ultimate of chaos resulting from weighted voting systems
• Inverted orders for monotone scoring rules
• More on the Preservation of Preference Proximity and Anonymous Social Choice
• On the selection of the same winner by all scoring rules

Cited In (5)

• On stable solutions to the ordinal social choice problem
• Pairwise consensus and the Borda rule
• Does avoiding bad voting rules result in good ones?
• Social acceptability of Condorcet committees
• Flexible level-1 consensus ensuring stable social choice: analysis and algorithms

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