Level r consensus and stable social choice
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1897331 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3405712 (Why is no real title available?)
- A comparison of some distance-based choice rules in ranking environments
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- Chaotic elections! A mathematician looks at voting
- Condorcet Social Choice Functions
- Explaining all three-alternative voting outcomes
- Inverted orders for monotone scoring rules
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- More on the Preservation of Preference Proximity and Anonymous Social Choice
- NON-NULL RANKING MODELS. I
- On the selection of the same winner by all scoring rules
- Preference Proximity and Anonymous Social Choice
- Social compromise and social metrics
- Some general results on the metric rationalization for social decision rules
- Some measures of closeness to unanimity and their implications
- The Borda Rule and Pareto Stability: A Comment
- The ultimate of chaos resulting from weighted voting systems
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