Does avoiding bad voting rules result in good ones?
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
- Distance rationalization of voting rules
- Rationalizations of Condorcet-consistent rules via distances of Hamming type
- A distance-based comparison of basic voting rules
- Distance rationalization of anonymous and homogeneous voting rules
- A comparison of some distance-based choice rules in ranking environments
Cites work
- Distance rationalization of voting rules
- Level \(r\) consensus and stable social choice
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Metric rationalization of social welfare functions
- Social choice and individual values
- Some general results on the metric rationalization for social decision rules
- Some measures of closeness to unanimity and their implications
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The Borda Rule and Pareto Stability: A Comment
Cited in
(9)- Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation?
- How good is a two-party election game?
- On the manipulability of a class of social choice functions: plurality \(k\)th rules
- Dictatorship versus manipulability
- A characterization of the rational mean neat voting rules
- Distance rationalization of anonymous and homogeneous voting rules
- Voting: a machine learning approach
- An indifference result for social choice rules in large societies
- Distance rationalization of voting rules
This page was built for publication: Does avoiding bad voting rules result in good ones?
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1728305)