A characterization of the rational mean neat voting rules
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Cites work
- A Note on Preference Aggregation
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
- Axiomatic derivation of scoring rules without the ordering assumption
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- Convex decompositions
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3693185 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 705150 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3320765 (Why is no real title available?)
- Social Choice Scoring Functions
Cited in
(7)- Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average?
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- The geometry of voting power: weighted voting and hyper-ellipsoids
- Rationalizations of Condorcet-consistent rules via distances of Hamming type
- Convex decompositions
- Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings
- Positive switching systems and the wealth distribution problem
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