A Note on Preference Aggregation

DOI10.2307/1914222zbMATH Open0297.90003OpenAlexW2125548872MaRDI QIDQ4051827FDOQ4051827

Authors: H. Peyton Young 

Publication date: 1974

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1914222

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Utility theory (91B16)

Cited In (17)

• Consistent approval-based multi-winner rules
• Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof
• Bivariate scoring rules: unifying the characterizations of positional scoring rules and Kemeny's rule
• Axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules
• Robustness of positional scoring over subsets of alternatives
• Inverted orders for monotone scoring rules
• Negative voting social welfare functions: a characterization
• Characteristic properties of list proportional representation systems
• An axiomatic characterization of the Borda mean rule
• The median rule in judgement aggregation
• Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average?
• Formal utilitarianism and range voting
• Money-metric utilitarianism
• Social threshold aggregations
• A characterization of the rational mean neat voting rules
• Variable-population voting rules
• The maximin support method: an extension of the d'Hondt method to approval-based multiwinner elections

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