Bivariate scoring rules: unifying the characterizations of positional scoring rules and Kemeny's rule
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Publication:6564045
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2024.105836zbMATH Open1547.91015MaRDI QIDQ6564045FDOQ6564045
Authors: Patrick Lederer 
Publication date: 28 June 2024
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
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