Scoring indices, top-truncated preferences, and splitting invariance

DOI10.1016/j.orl.2023.01.010zbMath1525.91081OpenAlexW4320168888MaRDI QIDQ6161905

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Publication date: 28 June 2023

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2023.01.010

zbMATH Keywords

splitting invariancetop-truncated preferencesweight-based scoring index

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Deriving weights from pairwise comparison matrices: The additive case
• Harsanyi's social aggregation theorem and the weak Pareto principle
• Characterizations of scoring methods for preference aggregation
• The Borda class. An axiomatic study of the Borda rule on top-truncated preferences
• An issue based power index
• Positionalist voting rules: a general definition and axiomatic characterizations
• A characterization of the Borda rule in peer ratings
• The original Borda count and partial voting
• Deriving weights from pairwise comparison matrices
• Social Choice Scoring Functions
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate

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