Scoring indices, top-truncated preferences, and splitting invariance

DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2023.01.010MaRDI QIDQ6161905zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors

Publication date 28 June 2023

Published in Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2023.01.010

zbMATH Keywords

splitting invariancetop-truncated preferencesweight-based scoring index

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• A characterization of the Borda rule in peer ratings
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• An issue based power index
• Characterizations of scoring methods for preference aggregation
• Deriving weights from pairwise comparison matrices
• Deriving weights from pairwise comparison matrices: The additive case
• Harsanyi's social aggregation theorem and the weak Pareto principle
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 44383 (Why is no real title available?)
• Positionalist voting rules: a general definition and axiomatic characterizations
• Social Choice Scoring Functions
• The Borda class. An axiomatic study of the Borda rule on top-truncated preferences
• The original Borda count and partial voting

Cited in

(1)

• Preference fusion when the number of alternatives exceeds two: Indirect scoring procedures

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