The Borda class. An axiomatic study of the Borda rule on top-truncated preferences
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Publication:1996173
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Cites work
- A Borda count for partially ordered ballots
- A proof technique for social choice with variable electorate
- Aggregation of binary evaluations: a Borda-like approach
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
- An axiomatic characterization of the Borda mean rule
- Axiomatic derivation of scoring rules without the ordering assumption
- Disposing dictators, demystifying voting paradoxes. Social choice analysis
- Introduction to the theory of voting
- Optimal truth-tracking rules for the aggregation of incomplete judgments
- Scoring rules for judgment aggregation
- Social Choice Scoring Functions
- The Borda dictionary
- The Borda Rule and Pareto Stability: A Comment
- The original Borda count and partial voting
Cited in
(9)- The Borda count with weak preferences
- The broken Borda rule and other refinements of approval ranking
- Scoring indices, top-truncated preferences, and splitting invariance
- Consistent social ranking solutions
- Iterative voting with partial preferences
- Ranking rankings: an axiomatic analysis
- Egalitarian random assignment
- A generalization to networks of Young's characterization of the Borda rule
- Normative uncertainty meets voting theory
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