Iterative voting with partial preferences

DOI10.1016/J.ARTINT.2024.104133MaRDI QIDQ6579295zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Zoi Terzopoulou, Panagiotis Terzopoulos, Ulle Endriss

Publication date 25 July 2024

Published in Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

social choice theoryiterative votingpartial preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Convergence of iterative scoring rules
• Iterative voting and acyclic games
• Restricted manipulation in iterative voting: convergence and Condorcet efficiency
• Restricted manipulation in iterative voting: Condorcet efficiency and Borda score

Cites work

• Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
• Best reply dynamics for scoring rules
• Convergence of iterative scoring rules
• Introduction to the theory of voting
• Iterative voting and acyclic games
• Plurality voting with truth-biased agents
• Restricted manipulation in iterative voting: Condorcet efficiency and Borda score
• The Borda class. An axiomatic study of the Borda rule on top-truncated preferences
• The computational impact of partial votes on strategic voting
• The impartial culture maximizes the probability of majority cycles
• The original Borda count and partial voting

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