Iterative voting with partial preferences

DOI10.1016/J.ARTINT.2024.104133zbMATH Open1545.91128MaRDI QIDQ6579295FDOQ6579295

Authors: Zoi Terzopoulou, Panagiotis Terzopoulos, Ulle Endriss 

Publication date: 25 July 2024

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Recommendations

• Convergence of iterative scoring rules
• Iterative voting and acyclic games
• Restricted manipulation in iterative voting: convergence and Condorcet efficiency
• Restricted manipulation in iterative voting: Condorcet efficiency and Borda score

zbMATH Keywords

social choice theoryiterative votingpartial preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
• Best reply dynamics for scoring rules
• The original Borda count and partial voting
• The impartial culture maximizes the probability of majority cycles
• Iterative voting and acyclic games
• Plurality voting with truth-biased agents
• Restricted manipulation in iterative voting: Condorcet efficiency and Borda score
• Convergence of iterative scoring rules
• Introduction to the theory of voting
• The computational impact of partial votes on strategic voting
• The Borda class. An axiomatic study of the Borda rule on top-truncated preferences

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