Plurality voting with truth-biased agents
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Publication:2856129
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-41392-6_3zbMATH Open1319.91071OpenAlexW40976406MaRDI QIDQ2856129FDOQ2856129
Authors: Svetlana Obraztsova, Evangelos Markakis, David R. M. Thompson 
Publication date: 23 October 2013
Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41392-6_3
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- Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule
- On stable outcomes of approval, plurality, and negative plurality games
- Beyond plurality: truth-bias in binary scoring rules
- Strategic manipulation in judgment aggregation under higher-level reasoning
- Iterative voting with partial preferences
- Equilibria of plurality voting: lazy and truth-biased voters
- Strong and weak acyclicity in iterative voting
- Iterative voting and acyclic games
- Gibbard-Satterthwaite games for \(k\)-approval voting rules
- Strategic voting and strategic candidacy
- Strategyproof judgment aggregation under partial information
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Inefficiency of equilibria in Doodle polls
- Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in \(k\)-approval voting
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