Plurality Voting with Truth-Biased Agents
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Publication:2856129
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-41392-6_3zbMath1319.91071OpenAlexW40976406MaRDI QIDQ2856129
David R. M. Thompson, Evangelos Markakis, Svetlana Obraztsova
Publication date: 23 October 2013
Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41392-6_3
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