Plurality voting with truth-biased agents

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-41392-6_3MaRDI QIDQ2856129zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Svetlana Obraztsova, Evangelos Markakis, David R. M. Thompson

Publication date 23 October 2013

Published in Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41392-6_3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Applications of game theory (91A80) Noncooperative games (91A10)

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Cited in

(14)

• Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule
• On stable outcomes of approval, plurality, and negative plurality games
• Beyond plurality: truth-bias in binary scoring rules
• Strategic manipulation in judgment aggregation under higher-level reasoning
• Iterative voting with partial preferences
• Equilibria of plurality voting: lazy and truth-biased voters
• Strong and weak acyclicity in iterative voting
• Iterative voting and acyclic games
• Gibbard-Satterthwaite games for k-approval voting rules
• Strategic voting and strategic candidacy
• Strategyproof judgment aggregation under partial information
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7450018 (Why is no real title available?)
• Inefficiency of equilibria in Doodle polls
• Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in \(k\)-approval voting

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