Plurality voting with truth-biased agents
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Publication:2856129
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Cited in
(14)- Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule
- On stable outcomes of approval, plurality, and negative plurality games
- Beyond plurality: truth-bias in binary scoring rules
- Strategic manipulation in judgment aggregation under higher-level reasoning
- Iterative voting with partial preferences
- Equilibria of plurality voting: lazy and truth-biased voters
- Strong and weak acyclicity in iterative voting
- Iterative voting and acyclic games
- Gibbard-Satterthwaite games for k-approval voting rules
- Strategic voting and strategic candidacy
- Strategyproof judgment aggregation under partial information
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7450018 (Why is no real title available?)
- Inefficiency of equilibria in Doodle polls
- Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in \(k\)-approval voting
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