Equilibria of plurality voting: lazy and truth-biased voters

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_9MaRDI QIDQ3449586zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Edith Elkind, Evangelos Markakis, Svetlana Obraztsova, Piotr Skowron

Publication date 4 November 2015

Published in Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1409.4132

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Voting theory (91B12)

Abstract: We present a systematic study of Plurality elections with strategic voters who, in addition to having preferences over election winners, have secondary preferences, which govern their behavior when their vote cannot affect the election outcome. Specifically, we study two models that have been recently considered in the literature: lazy voters, who prefer to abstain when they are not pivotal, and truth-biased voters, who prefer to vote truthfully when they are not pivotal. We extend prior work by investigating the behavior of both lazy and truth-biased voters under different tie-breaking rules (lexicographic rule, random voter rule, random candidate rule). Two of these six combinations of secondary preferences and a tie-breaking rule have been studied in prior work. In order to understand the impact of different secondary preferences and tie-breaking rules on the election outcomes, we study the remaining four combinations. We characterize pure Nash equilibria (PNE) of the resulting strategic games and study the complexity of related computational problems. Our results extend to settings where some of the voters may be non-strategic.

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Cites work

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Cited in

(10)

• Strategic voting in a social context: considerate equilibria
• Strategy-proofness implies minimal participation under single-peakedness
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7561332 (Why is no real title available?)
• Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in \(k\)-approval voting
• Collective bias models in two-tier voting systems and the democracy deficit
• Equilibria of plurality voting: lazy and truth-biased voters
• Gibbard-Satterthwaite games for \(k\)-approval voting rules
• Beyond plurality: truth-bias in binary scoring rules
• Plurality voting with truth-biased agents
• Equilibria in Doodle polls under three tie-breaking rules

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