On the welfare of cardinal voting mechanisms

DOI10.4230/LIPICS.FSTTCS.2018.27MaRDI QIDQ5090964FDO

Authors Umang Bhaskar, Abheek Ghosh

Publication date 21 July 2022

zbMATH Keywords

price of anarchydistortioncomputational social choicevoting rulescardinal mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical aspects of software engineering (specification, verification, metrics, requirements, etc.) (68N30) Theory of computing (68Qxx)

Recommendations

• Truthful approximations to range voting
• Peeking behind the ordinal curtain: improving distortion via cardinal queries
• The distortion of distributed metric social choice
• Revisiting the distortion of distributed voting
• Welfare maximization and truthfulness in mechanism design with ordinal preferences

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3630437 (Why is no real title available?)
• An alternative proof of Gibbard's random dictatorship result
• An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions
• Equilibria of plurality voting: lazy and truth-biased voters
• Handbook of Computational Social Choice
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Optimal social choice functions: a utilitarian view
• Responsive lotteries
• Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes
• Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers
• Truthful approximations to range voting

Cited in

(2)

• Revisiting the distortion of distributed voting
• Voting with a Logarithmic Number of Cards

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