On the welfare of cardinal voting mechanisms

DOI10.4230/LIPICS.FSTTCS.2018.27MaRDI QIDQ5090964FDOQ5090964

Authors: Umang Bhaskar, Abheek Ghosh 

Publication date: 21 July 2022

Recommendations

• Truthful approximations to range voting
• Peeking behind the ordinal curtain: improving distortion via cardinal queries
• The distortion of distributed metric social choice
• Revisiting the distortion of distributed voting
• Welfare maximization and truthfulness in mechanism design with ordinal preferences

zbMATH Keywords

price of anarchydistortioncomputational social choicevoting rulescardinal mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical aspects of software engineering (specification, verification, metrics, requirements, etc.) (68N30) Theory of computing (68Qxx)

Cites Work

• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Handbook of Computational Social Choice
• An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions
• Optimal social choice functions: a utilitarian view
• Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
• Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes
• Truthful approximations to range voting
• An alternative proof of Gibbard's random dictatorship result
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Equilibria of plurality voting: lazy and truth-biased voters
• Responsive lotteries

Cited In (2)

• Voting with a Logarithmic Number of Cards
• Revisiting the distortion of distributed voting

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