Strategic voting in a social context: considerate equilibria

DOI10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-1423zbMATH Open1396.91128OpenAlexW2579754465MaRDI QIDQ4576255FDOQ4576255

Authors Laurent Gourvès, Julien Lesca, Anaëlle Wilczynski

Publication date 12 July 2018

Full work available at URL https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01392850

zbMATH Keywords

graphssocial networkstrategic votingvoting gameelectionvoting rulescoalitional equilibriaconsiderate equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in \(k\)-approval voting
• Gibbard-Satterthwaite games for \(k\)-approval voting rules
• Equilibria of plurality voting: lazy and truth-biased voters
• Is it ever safe to vote strategically?
• New results on equilibria in strategic candidacy

Cited in

(4)

• Socially desirable approximations for dodgson’s voting rule
• Strategic voting in the context of stable-matching of teams
• Empathetic decision making in social networks
• A unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group-specific costs

This page was built for publication: Strategic voting in a social context: considerate equilibria

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4576255)