Socially desirable approximations for dodgson’s voting rule
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5501960
DOI10.1145/2556950zbMath1322.91028OpenAlexW2084807538MaRDI QIDQ5501960
Ioannis Caragiannis, Nikos Karanikolas, Ariel D. Procaccia, Christos Kaklamanis
Publication date: 14 August 2015
Published in: ACM Transactions on Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/2556950
Related Items (7)
Properties of multiwinner voting rules ⋮ Finding a collective set of items: from proportional multirepresentation to group recommendation ⋮ Justified representation in approval-based committee voting ⋮ Approximately classic judgement aggregation ⋮ Multi-attribute proportional representation ⋮ Proportional Approval Voting, Harmonic k-median, and Negative Association ⋮ On the approximability of Dodgson and Young elections
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules
- Guarantees for the success frequency of an algorithm for finding Dodgson-election winners
- Approximability of Dodgson's rule
- Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- On the approximability of Dodgson and Young elections
- Parameterized computational complexity of Dodgson and Young elections
- Multimode Control Attacks on Elections
- The Computational Complexity of Choice Sets
- Some Remarks on Dodgson's Voting Rule
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Condorcet Social Choice Functions
- Exact analysis of Dodgson elections
- Aggregating inconsistent information
- Ordering by weighted number of wins gives a good ranking for weighted tournaments
- Algorithmic mechanism design
This page was built for publication: Socially desirable approximations for dodgson’s voting rule
