Approximately classic judgement aggregation

DOI10.1007/S10472-013-9358-6zbMATH Open1294.91047arXiv1008.3829OpenAlexW3101283436MaRDI QIDQ2436699FDOQ2436699

Ilan Nehama

Publication date: 25 February 2014

Published in: Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: In this paper we analyze judgement aggregation problems in which a group of agents independently votes on a set of complex propositions that has some interdependency constraint between them(e.g., transitivity when describing preferences). We consider the issue of judgement aggregation from the perspective of approximation. That is, we generalize the previous results by studying approximate judgement aggregation. We relax the main two constraints assumed in the current literature, Consistency and Independence and consider mechanisms that only approximately satisfy these constraints, that is, satisfy them up to a small portion of the inputs. The main question we raise is whether the relaxation of these notions significantly alters the class of satisfying aggregation mechanisms. The recent works for preference aggregation of Kalai, Mossel, and Keller fit into this framework. The main result of this paper is that, as in the case of preference aggregation, in the case of a subclass of a natural class of aggregation problems termed `truth-functional agendas', the set of satisfying aggregation mechanisms does not extend non-trivially when relaxing the constraints. Our proof techniques involve Boolean Fourier transform and analysis of voter influences for voting protocols. The question we raise for Approximate Aggregation can be stated in terms of Property Testing. For instance, as a corollary from our result we get a generalization of the classic result for property testing of linearity of Boolean functions. An updated version (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp574R) is available at http://www.ratio.huji.ac.il/dp_files/dp574R.pdf

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1008.3829

zbMATH Keywords

judgement aggregationcomputational social choiceapproximate aggregationinconsistency indexcomputational judgement aggregationdependency indextruth-functional agendas

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Algebraic aggregation theory
• Aggregation of non-binary evaluations
• Arrow's theorem in judgment aggregation
• Judgment aggregation: (im)possibility theorems
• Democratic answers to complex questions -- an epistemic perspective
• On the question ``who is a \(J\)?: a social choice approach
• The theory of judgment aggregation: an introductory review
• The probability of inconsistencies in complex collective decisions
• Belief merging and the discursive dilemma: an argument-based account to paradoxes of judgment aggregation
• Factoring out the impossibility of logical aggregation
• Introduction to judgment aggregation
• Aggregation of binary evaluations
• Self-testing/correcting with applications to numerical problems
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Information and preference aggregation
• Sequential composition of voting rules in multi-issue domains
• A Fourier-theoretic perspective on the Condorcet paradox and Arrow's theorem.
• t or 1 - t. That is the Trade-Off
• Socially desirable approximations for dodgson’s voting rule
• A quantitative Arrow theorem
• Aggregation of equivalence relations
• Arrow's theorem as a corollary
• Group identification
• A tight quantitative version of Arrow's impossibility theorem
• Consistent judgement aggregation: the truth-functional case
• Aggregation of binary evaluations for truth-functional agendas
• A quantitative discursive dilemma

Cited In (4)

• Neutrality and relative acceptability in judgment aggregation
• A phase transition in Arrow's theorem with three alternatives
• Judgment aggregation without full rationality
• Probabilistic view of voting, paradoxes, and manipulation

Uses Software

• JBool

This page was built for publication: Approximately classic judgement aggregation

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2436699)