Arrow's theorem as a corollary

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(03)00118-6zbMath1254.91138MaRDI QIDQ1927359

Klaus Nehring

Publication date: 1 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

independence of irrelevant alternativespreference aggregationS3 convex structure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (15)

A generalised model of judgment aggregation ⋮ The theory of judgment aggregation: an introductory review ⋮ The doctrinal paradox, the discursive dilemma, and logical aggregation theory ⋮ Aggregation theory and the relevance of some issues to others ⋮ Approximately classic judgement aggregation ⋮ Propositionwise judgment aggregation: the general case ⋮ Judgment aggregation without full rationality ⋮ Consistent judgement aggregation: the truth-functional case ⋮ Arrow's theorem in judgment aggregation ⋮ Introduction to judgment aggregation ⋮ Abstract Arrowian aggregation ⋮ Aggregation of binary evaluations ⋮ Aggregation of binary evaluations with abstentions ⋮ Methods for distance-based judgment aggregation ⋮ An Arrovian impossibility in combining ranking and evaluation

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Abstract Arrowian aggregation
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Voting under constraints
• Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: A unified approach

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