Strategy-proofness implies minimal participation under single-peakedness
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Publication:6164134
DOI10.1007/s40505-023-00247-5zbMath1520.91158OpenAlexW4366991731MaRDI QIDQ6164134
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Publication date: 27 July 2023
Published in: Economic Theory Bulletin (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-023-00247-5
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- The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information
- Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules
- Equilibria of Plurality Voting: Lazy and Truth-Biased Voters
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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