Strategy-proofness implies minimal participation under single-peakedness

DOI10.1007/s40505-023-00247-5zbMath1520.91158OpenAlexW4366991731MaRDI QIDQ6164134

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Publication date: 27 July 2023

Published in: Economic Theory Bulletin (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-023-00247-5

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessparticipationcostly votinggeneralized medians

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

New characterizations of strategy-proofness under single-peakedness

Cites Work

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• The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information
• Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules
• Equilibria of Plurality Voting: Lazy and Truth-Biased Voters
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result

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