On the generic strategic stability of Nash equilibria if voting is costly
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1779013
DOI10.1007/s00199-003-0441-9zbMath1107.91006OpenAlexW3125111876MaRDI QIDQ1779013
Giovanna Iannantuoni, Francesco De Sinopoli
Publication date: 20 June 2005
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/280
Related Items
Robust rational turnout ⋮ Equilibria of Plurality Voting: Lazy and Truth-Biased Voters ⋮ Generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in network-formation games ⋮ On participation games with complete information ⋮ Generic finiteness of outcome distributions for two-person game forms with three outcomes ⋮ Costly network formation and regular equilibria ⋮ Gibbard-Satterthwaite games for \(k\)-approval voting rules