On the generic strategic stability of Nash equilibria if voting is costly (Q1779013)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2177221
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| English | On the generic strategic stability of Nash equilibria if voting is costly |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2177221 |
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On the generic strategic stability of Nash equilibria if voting is costly (English)
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20 June 2005
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Plurality rule
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regular equilibria
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stable sets.
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0.8350520730018616
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0.832771360874176
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0.816029965877533
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0.8030479550361633
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0.7972984910011292
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