Costly network formation and regular equilibria
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Publication:980973
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.12.004zbMATH Open1231.91041OpenAlexW3123018765MaRDI QIDQ980973FDOQ980973
Authors: Francesco De Sinopoli, Carlos Pimienta
Publication date: 8 July 2010
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://research.economics.unsw.edu.au/RePEc/papers/2009-05.pdf
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Cited In (12)
- Network formation under negative degree-based externalities
- Nash equilibria of network formation games under consent
- Network-formation games with regular objectives
- Generic finiteness of outcome distributions for two-person game forms with three outcomes
- Network formation under mutual consent and costly communication
- Network-formation games with regular objectives
- Inequality and network formation games
- On the Structure of Equilibria in Basic Network Formation
- Allocating value among farsighted players in network formation
- A note on network formation with decay
- Generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in network-formation games
- Selfish network creation with non-uniform edge cost
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