Network formation under mutual consent and costly communication

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2010.08.001MaRDI QIDQ607259zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Robert P. Gilles, Sudipta Sarangi

Publication date 19 November 2010

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2010.08.001

zbMATH Keywords

trustsocial networksnetwork formationpairwise stabilityself-confirming equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Noncooperative games (91A10) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Recommendations

• Building Social Networks Under Consent: A Survey
• Nash equilibria of network formation games under consent
• Network formation and stable equilibrium
• Costly network formation and regular equilibria
• A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
• A strategic model of social and economic networks
• Farsighted network formation
• Farsightedly stable networks
• Network potentials
• Networks and farsighted stability
• Potential games
• Social and economic networks.
• Strongly stable networks
• The evolution of social and economic networks.
• The formation of networks with transfers among players

Cited in

(7)

• Coalition-proof stable networks
• Optimism leads to optimality: ambiguity in network formation
• Formation of a communication network under perfect foresight
• Nash equilibria of network formation games under consent
• Unilateral vs. bilateral link-formation: a transition without decay
• Building Social Networks Under Consent: A Survey
• Stability, efficiency, and contentedness of social storage networks

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