Coalition-proof stable networks

DOI10.1007/S10058-021-00264-5zbMATH Open1494.91028OpenAlexW3199630836MaRDI QIDQ2149191FDOQ2149191

C. Luo, Vincent Vannetelbosch, Ana Mauleon

Publication date: 28 June 2022

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00264-5

zbMATH Keywords

networksstabilityfarsightednesscoalition-proofnessexistence and efficiencygroup deviations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Cites Work

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• Definitions of equilibrium in network formation games
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• Network formation under mutual consent and costly communication
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Cited In (3)

• Local farsightedness in network formation
• Farsightedly stable networks
• Stable and efficient coalitional networks

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