Coalition-proof stable networks
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2149191
DOI10.1007/S10058-021-00264-5zbMATH Open1494.91028OpenAlexW3199630836MaRDI QIDQ2149191FDOQ2149191
Authors: C. Luo, Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch 
Publication date: 28 June 2022
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00264-5
Recommendations
Cites Work
- A strategic model of social and economic networks
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- Social and economic networks.
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Connections. An introduction to the economics of networks.
- Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation games
- Farsightedly stable networks
- Stable networks
- The evolution of social and economic networks.
- The formation of networks with transfers among players
- Strongly stable networks
- Farsighted network formation
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Definitions of equilibrium in network formation games
- Farsighted free trade networks
- Contractually stable networks
- Stable and efficient coalitional networks
- Network formation under mutual consent and costly communication
- Equilibrium refinements for the network formation game
- Network formation with myopic and farsighted players
- Stability of networks under horizon-\(K\) farsightedness
Cited In (4)
This page was built for publication: Coalition-proof stable networks
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2149191)
