Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation games
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Cites work
- A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
- A conjecture of Shapley and Shubik on competitive outcomes in the cores of NTU market games
- A dynamic solution concept for abstract games
- A game with no solution
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- A strategic model of social and economic networks
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- Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
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- Farsighted stability in hedonic games
- Farsightedly stable networks
- Farsightedness and cautiousness in coalition formation games with positive spillovers
- Graphs and Cooperation in Games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078999 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
- Markets with a Continuum of Traders
- Networks and farsighted stability
- Pairwise-stability and Nash equilibria in network formation
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- Solutions of irreflexive relations
- Stable networks
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Cited in
(42)- Farsightedly stable networks
- Constitutions and groups
- The farsighted core in a political game with asymmetric information
- Sharing market access in buyer-seller networks
- Single-payoff farsighted stable sets in strategic games with dominant punishment strategies
- Myopic and farsighted stability in network formation games: an experimental study
- Cautious farsighted stability in network formation games with streams of payoffs
- Sequential competition and the strategic origins of preferential attachment
- Coordination on networks with farsighted and myopic agents
- Link investment substitutability: a factor influencing network formation
- Coalition-proof stable networks
- Matching with myopic and farsighted players
- Risk-sharing networks and farsighted stability
- Stability of networks under horizon-\(K\) farsightedness
- Maximin, minimax, and von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stable sets
- A characterization of farsightedly stable networks
- Coalition formation among farsighted agents
- Contractually stable networks
- Stable sets in matching problems with coalitional sovereignty and path dominance
- Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem
- Horizon-\(K\) farsightedness in criminal networks
- Myopic-farsighted absorbing networks
- Bargaining in endogenous trading networks
- Identity and fragmentation in networks
- Dominance invariant one-to-one matching problems
- Cooperative games (von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets)
- Networks and stability
- The myopic stable set for social environments
- Bounded budget connection (BBC) games or how to make friends and influence people, on a budget
- Social rationalizability with mediation
- Limited farsightedness in R\&D network formation
- Layered networks, equilibrium dynamics, and stable coalitions
- Correction to: ``Layered networks, equilibrium dynamics, and stable coalitions
- Designing rotation programs: limits and possibilities
- Local farsightedness in network formation
- Minimal farsighted instability
- On the farsightedly and myopically stable international environmental agreements
- Do stable outcomes survive in marriage problems with myopic and farsighted players?
- Dynamic network formation with farsighted players and limited capacities
- An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes
- Network formation with myopic and farsighted players
- Club networks with multiple memberships and noncooperative stability
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