Recommendations
Cites work
- A strategic model of social and economic networks
- Coalition formation among farsighted agents
- Coalitional stability under perfect foresight
- Contractually stable networks
- Coordination on networks with farsighted and myopic agents
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- The formation of networks with transfers among players
- von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching
- Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice
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