Contractually stable networks
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Publication:2376073
DOI10.1007/s00182-012-0356-4zbMath1269.91021MaRDI QIDQ2376073
Jean-François Caulier, Ana Mauleon, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch
Publication date: 26 June 2013
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0356-4
91D30: Social networks; opinion dynamics
91A43: Games involving graphs
91A80: Applications of game theory
91B10: Group preferences
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