Contractually stable networks

DOI10.1007/s00182-012-0356-4zbMath1269.91021MaRDI QIDQ2376073

Jean-François Caulier, Ana Mauleon, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch

Publication date: 26 June 2013

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0356-4

zbMATH Keywords

networks; coalition structures; strong efficiency; contractual stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91D30: Social networks; opinion dynamics

91A43: Games involving graphs

91A80: Applications of game theory

91B10: Group preferences

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