Matching with myopic and farsighted players
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Publication:2220937
Recommendations
- von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching
- Myopic and farsighted stable sets in 2-player strategic-form games
- Farsighted objections and maximality in one-to-one matching problems
- Network formation with myopic and farsighted players
- Farsighted stability with heterogeneous expectations
Cites work
- A note on generalized stable sets
- A polynomial-time algorithm to find von Neumann-Morgenstern stable matchings in marriage games
- A strategic model of social and economic networks
- An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
- Coalition formation and history dependence
- Coalitional stability under perfect foresight
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
- Dominance invariant one-to-one matching problems
- Farsighted coalitional stability
- Farsighted stability in hedonic games
- Farsighted stability with heterogeneous expectations
- Farsightedly stable networks
- Farsightedness and cautiousness in coalition formation games with positive spillovers
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3558960 (Why is no real title available?)
- Maximality in the farsighted stable set
- Networks and farsighted stability
- Pillage and property
- Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
- Rational expectations and farsighted stability
- Rationalizability for social environments
- Stability of networks under horizon-\(K\) farsightedness
- Stable sets in matching problems with coalitional sovereignty and path dominance
- Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation games
- The evolution of social and economic networks.
- The farsighted stable set
- The myopic stable set for social environments
- von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems
Cited in
(23)- A bargaining set for roommate problems
- Cautious farsighted stability in network formation games with streams of payoffs
- Coordination on networks with farsighted and myopic agents
- Farsighted manipulation and exploitation in networks
- Stability of networks under horizon-\(K\) farsightedness
- Myopic and farsighted stable sets in 2-player strategic-form games
- Farsighted objections and maximality in one-to-one matching problems
- Myopic-farsighted absorbing networks
- Close-knit neighborhoods: stability of cooperation in networks
- Social rationalizability with mediation
- Coalition formation under dominance invariance
- Assortative matching with externalities and farsighted agents
- Limited farsightedness in R\&D network formation
- Local farsightedness in network formation
- Minimal farsighted instability
- School choice with farsighted students
- Credible sets
- Matching markets with farsighted couples
- Network stability under limited foresight
- Do stable outcomes survive in marriage problems with myopic and farsighted players?
- Existence of myopic-farsighted stable sets in matching markets
- Axiomatization of the farsighted stable set and the (strong) rational expectations farsighted stable set
- Network formation with myopic and farsighted players
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