Close-knit neighborhoods: stability of cooperation in networks

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105775MaRDI QIDQ6139989zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Arnold Polanski

Publication date 19 January 2024

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105775

zbMATH Keywords

networkspublic goodsconsistent setsfarsightedly stable sets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Public goods (91B18)

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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7196833 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7085087 (Why is no real title available?)
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• von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching

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