Farsightedness and cautiousness in coalition formation games with positive spillovers
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Publication:1768404
DOI10.1007/s11238-004-2646-1zbMath1090.91009MaRDI QIDQ1768404
Ana Mauleon, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch
Publication date: 15 March 2005
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-004-2646-1
91A12: Cooperative games
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Cites Work
- Cooperative games with coalition structures
- A theory of endogenous coalition structures
- On coalition-proof Nash equilibria in common agency games
- Refinements of rationalizability for normal-form games
- Farsighted coalitional stability
- Equilibrium binding agreements
- Stable coalition structures with externalities
- Endogeneous formation of competing partnerships with moral hazard
- Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
- Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
