Farsightedness and cautiousness in coalition formation games with positive spillovers
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Cites work
- A theory of endogenous coalition structures
- Cooperative games with coalition structures
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- Farsighted coalitional stability
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Cited in
(40)- Farsighted coalitional stability in TU-games
- Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation games
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