Equilibrium binding agreements

DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.2236zbMath0872.90125MaRDI QIDQ1357420

Rajiv Vohra, Debraj Ray

Publication date: 10 June 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.2236

zbMATH Keywords

efficiency of the outcomes; equilibrium binding agreements

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

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