Cooperation with Network Monitoring

DOI10.1093/restud/rds016zbMath1405.91033OpenAlexW2111844148MaRDI QIDQ4610582

Alexander Wolitzky

Publication date: 23 January 2019

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/f6c6d19f0565399c6290b0415747d84970d5ee39

zbMATH Keywords

networksrepeated gamespublic goodscooperationcentralityprivate monitoringgroup size and structure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43) Public goods (91B18) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (11)

Trust in cohesive communities ⋮ Who will watch the watchers? On optimal monitoring networks ⋮ Contagion and uninvadability in local interaction games: the bilingual game and general supermodular games ⋮ Failure of gradualism under imperfect monitoring ⋮ Close-knit neighborhoods: stability of cooperation in networks ⋮ Stability in repeated matching markets ⋮ Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring ⋮ Exclusive intermediation in unobservable networks ⋮ Cooperative networks with robust private monitoring ⋮ The evolutionary advantage of limited network knowledge ⋮ Dynamic network formation with foresighted agents

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