Who will watch the watchers? On optimal monitoring networks
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Publication:2173097
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2020.105018zbMath1437.91206OpenAlexW3007987915MaRDI QIDQ2173097
Publication date: 22 April 2020
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105018
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