Who will watch the watchers? On optimal monitoring networks

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2020.105018zbMath1437.91206OpenAlexW3007987915MaRDI QIDQ2173097

Wang Xiang

Publication date: 22 April 2020

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105018

zbMATH Keywords

networkmonitoringbribery

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Organizing growth
• Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring
• Networks of relations and word-of-mouth communication
• Stopping agents from ``cheating
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring.
• Language and the Theory of the Firm
• How to Organize Crime¹
• Contracting with Externalities
• Communication with tokens in repeated games on networks
• Cooperation with Network Monitoring

This page was built for publication: Who will watch the watchers? On optimal monitoring networks