Who will watch the watchers? On optimal monitoring networks

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2020.105018MaRDI QIDQ2173097zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Wang Xiang

Publication date 22 April 2020

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105018

zbMATH Keywords

networkmonitoringbribery

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Public goods (91B18)

Recommendations

• Cooperation with network monitoring
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Cites work

• Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring.
• Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring
• Communication with tokens in repeated games on networks
• Connections. An introduction to the economics of networks.
• Contracting with Externalities
• Cooperation with network monitoring
• How to Organize Crime¹
• Language and the theory of the firm
• Networks of relations and word-of-mouth communication
• Organizing growth
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Social and economic networks.
• Stopping agents from ``cheating

Cited in

(3)

• Partners in crime? Corruption as a criminal network
• Optimal monitoring of networks
• Peers or police?: the effect of choice and type of monitoring in the provision of public goods

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