Moral hazard and private monitoring

DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2861zbMath1001.91006OpenAlexW2046227009MaRDI QIDQ1604517

R. Smith

Publication date: 4 July 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/1518ceacd32d231a29aaa3a5ffb2a2b4d70ccb22

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items

Commitment and observability in a contracting environment ⋮ Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games ⋮ Cooperative teaching and learning of actions ⋮ When (not) to publicize inspection results ⋮ Strategic buyers and privately observed prices ⋮ A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games ⋮ Hiding information in electoral competition. ⋮ Introduction to repeated games with private monitoring ⋮ Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring ⋮ On sustaining cooperation without public observations ⋮ On failing to cooperate when monitoring is private ⋮ Repeated games with almost-public monitoring ⋮ Collusion in dynamic Bertrand oligopoly with correlated private signals and communication

Cites Work

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